The State and Innovation Policy in Late Development: Evidence from South Africa and Malaysia by Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, Banji & Sampath, Padmashree Gehl
Paper presented in the IV Globelics Conference at Mexico City, September 22-24 2008 
Globelics 
 
The State and Innovation Policy in Late Development: Evidence from 
South Africa and Malaysia 
 
Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka  





This paper analyses the main institutional mechanisms that foster the emergence and 
performance of firms in knowledge-intensive sectors in developing countries. We use the 
empirical data collected in 2005 and 2006 in the South African computer hardware and 
software sectors and the Malaysian computer hardware sector  to illustrate the linkages 
between interactive learning and technological capabilities and how state support plays a 
critical role in enabling this in the case of knowledge intensive industries. However, as 
the analysis in this paper shows, state support is not just implementing a set of policies 
that succeed elsewhere; it is the ability of the state to set up institutions that reflect a 
harmony between knowledge and physical infrastructure and the formal and informal 
institutional compensations that are important to, and structure the idiosyncratic exchange 
processes of developing economies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes the determinants of innovation and firm performance resulting from 
collaborative learning in the South African and Malaysian computer sector, which 
consists of software and hardware specialized firms. The analysis focuses on two main 
propositions. The first is to examine the well-established notion that the microeconomic 
processes of interactive learning leads to innovation even in the context of a latecomer 
economy. The second proposition is that firms in a latecomer economy require state 
support to produce and innovate because markets do not function well. In such contexts 
policy choices made are instrumental in explaining the success/ failure of sectors. 
However, as the analysis in this paper shows, state support is not just implementing a set 
of policies that succeed elsewhere; it is the ability of the state to set up institutions that 
reflect a harmony between knowledge and physical infrastructure and the formal and 
informal institutional compensations are important to, and structure the idiosyncratic 
exchange processes of developing economies. 
Essentially, technical change or innovation is largely incremental but nonetheless useful 
in advancing productivity growth and has been classified into three different categories 
(Bell, 1984). First we have technical change that involves the introduction of new 
techniques (products and processes) into the economy through new investments in plants 
and machinery. This type of technical change broadens the industrial base of the 
economy. The second form of technological change involves evolutionary (incremental) 
improvement to existing techniques by effecting technical change to existing products 
and third, the generation of new knowledge through research within the firms or within 
separate R&D institutions. 
So how and what explains the process by which countries and firms move from one level 
or knowledge domain to the other? The observed structure of knowledge or sets of 
capabilities that one finds in an economy is a result of cumulative technological mastery 
and investment efforts made over a long time. In other words, technological change is a 
cumulative and path-dependent process, in order words, national or firm level actions 
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taken in previous times condition the current state of capabilities. In short technological 
capabilities acquisition processes are not just strongly cumulative in nature they have 
elements of strong path dependence (Dosi, Nelson et al. 1988). The conceptual and 
empirical literature on technological capabilities (TC) blossomed in the late 1980s 
received considerable attention from the mid-1980s through and early 1990s (Westphal, 
Kim and Dahlman (1985; Dahlman, Ross-Larson et al,1987); Lall,1990, 1992; Bell and 
Pavitt, 1993, 1995). Several authors refined the typologies and elaborated upon them but 
essentially the key ideas revolve around the same concepts1. The essential elements of the 
framework are as follows:  
1. TC focuses on efforts to “make effective use of technological knowledge in 
production, investment and innovation Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985) [p. 171]’.  
2. The process has strong heuristic elements of feedback from previous experiences to 
current states and as such skills and knowledge gained in previous domain becomes part 
of the organizational memory of firms and nations that create a new capability domain 
resulting in more efficient techniques and systems2.  
3. The build up of capabilities therefore entails individual and organizational “learning” 
(Lall, 1987, 1990, 1992; Dahlman and Westphal 1982; Katz 1984, 1987 and Dahlman, 
Ross-Larson et al., 1987). The process is re-conceptualized as essentially efforts by 
organizations to master technological functions though learning driven by explicit 
investment.  
4. Firms and nations require explicit investment capabilities in order to identify, prepare, 
design, set up and commission a new industrial project (or an expansion of it). In other 
words if the processes of capability build up must continue, this set of skills and 
experience will be built in a co-evolutionary process with technical capacity.  
                                                
1 Authors Nelson and Winter (1982) developed the notions of “routines”. Bell (1984), Scott-Kemmis and 
Bell (1988), Katz  (1987), used “technological capacity” to described the learning processes involved in 
building up a minimum base of essential knowledge to engage in innovative activity. 
2 Dahlman, Ross-Larson et al., (1987) conceived TC as the ways to use existing technology to produce 
more efficiently and to use the experience gained in production and investment to adapt and improve the 
technology in use. 
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5. As technical change and innovation do not take place in isolation and is only possible 
within a network of other actors, firms and countries require a systemic framework. This 
has been conceptualized as “linkage capabilities” which knowledge and experience 
required to foster interactive learning (see point 3 above).3 
However, capability acquisition is largely driven by interactive learning, which is 
conducted with a multiplicity of firms and non-enterprise actors in any system. A firm 
needs external knowledge on a continual basis to regenerate itself failing which it might 
well stagnate or regress. The stage-wise gradation of firm/country from one level of 
knowledge and technological capability to a next higher one over time reflects the 
heuristic feedback loops involved between policies and institutions that promote 
interactive learning and thus help to build capacity. The mode of learning is also related 
to the level of capability that a firm or country has accumulated. The amount of learning 
and skills required to move from the lowest domain of artisanal and indigenous 
manufacturing to the second lowest knowledge domain of modern manufacturing are 
embedded in primary and secondary schooling capacities, apprenticeship training, 
training to read engineering designs and blueprints and organisation of production. 
Several of these aspects are missing in developing countries – foundary making, metal 
cutting, and so on – are essential skills to move to the next higher level but a hiatus in 
several most developing countries since they constitute “nodes of learning” (Rosenberg, 
1976). To move from here to the next higher knowledge domain to design and re-
engineer products and innovate, one needs not only primary and secondary schooling but 
tertiary education that equips individuals with technical and analytical skills and public 
sector investments into building basic R&D capabilities for standards, metrology and 
other infrastructure. To operate in this domain, a country also requires significant 
entrepreneurial capabilities which act on the ‘demand side’ of the market, and act to 
stimulate demand for certain kinds of products (Rodrik, 2007). The learning associated 
with transitioning to this knowledge domain is more systematic and systemic, rigorous 
                                                
3 Linkage capabilities are defined as “…the capacity of forging co-operation between managers and 
workers within the firm, for securing co-operation between firms in the supply chain, and for 
crafting co-operative interfaces between firms and the wider institutional milieu, be it 
local, regional, or international” (Cooke and Morgan 2000). 
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and has to be sustained over a long period of time and capable of being replicated across 
several sectors. It also requires an unlearning of several of the conventional ways of 
conducting the innovation business in these countries. This means new perspectives on 
collaboration, public-private partnerships, education system design and administering of 
courses as well as new entrepreneurship models. For a country to move from here to the 
final knowledge domain where learning becomes concentrated in R&D activities and can 
be measured using conventional indicators, such as patents, skilled employees, and so on. 
At this level, the absorptive capacity of firms/entities relies on concentrated efforts in key 
facilities by highly specialised individuals who conduct research and design activities 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This is the level where orthodox measure of R&D as a 
source of national knowledge begins to apply. 
Catching–up is both a mountain climbing metaphor as it is a marathon challenge where 
firms and countries practically run the gauntlet and whereby failure is costly. The notion 
of latecomer therefore signifies the fact that the entity (country or firm) is late to meeting 
up certain key capabilities compared with both the forerunners as well as competitors. 
Economic history shows that whereas countries move easily from the lowest knowledge 
domain to the next higher one, moving further up into knowledge domains that focus on 
incremental design and innovation and then to frontier innovation is ridden with lack of 
success. Several countries on a supposedly sound catch-up path often do not move as 
predicted or regress along this path mainly due to the inability of these countries to 
manage the coordination efforts required in setting up a sound basis to move to the next 
knowledge domain. This is not surprising since the efforts required are significant and 
need to be designed to combat both market failure and government failure 
simultaneously. Merely focusing on industrial policy that does not take into account the 
scale effects, thresholds of scientists of engineers and minimal standards of domestic 
knowledge infrastructure as well as conducive policy environment for domestic 
innovation are common flaws in latecomer countries. 
In this paper, we use the empirical data collected in South Africa and Malaysia to 
illustrate these interlinkages between state policy, technological capabilities and 
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interactive learning. Sections 2 and 3 present the results of our innovation surveys in the 
South African and Malaysian computer sectors respectively. Our empirical analysis 
focuses specifically on factors that impact upon new product development in the sector, 
and a discussion on the actors and triggers for innovation. We then discuss the 
comparative insights on learning and collaborative behaviour as well as state support in 
section 4. The South African data used in this Paper was collected during a 2006 survey, 
which consists of 82 South African firms from the computer sector of which 19 firms are 
computer hardware firms. The Malaysian data was collected between 2004 and 2006 
from two computer clusters, namely Penang and Johor.4 The survey covered 360 firms 
from both clusters. 
 
In the empirical analysis, we use t- and z-tests to stress the differences between the 
software and hardware sectors. In the South African data, we consider a probit model of 
innovation, which is estimated by maximum likelihood and a linear and a censored 
regression model of economic performance. The linear regression model is estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variables, limited information maximum 
likelihood and generalized method of moments, and the censored regression is estimated 
using maximum likelihood. Finally, we carry out a descriptive analysis using t- and z-
tests to study the characteristics that distinguish collaborators from non-collaborators. 
 
2. The South African Computer Sector 
 
In South Africa, emerging high-tech activities in the computer sector have a strong 
geographic locus; such firms are concentrated in Gauteng and to a less extent in the 
Western Cape. We consider four types of actor interactions in our analysis to understand 
the innovation dynamics of the sector, namely: subcontractors, industry associations, 
main suppliers and buyers. Appendix Table 1 presents the definition of the dependent and 
independent variables used in the innovation and performance analysis, and Table 6 
reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample, when contrasted with those of the 
                                                
4 The data collection was carried out by Prof. Rajah Rasiah for one of the authors’ projects. A more 
elaborate discussion of the issue is found in Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Rasiah (2008), “Uneven Paths of 
Development: Learning and Innovation in Asia and Africa” 
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hardware computer firms. 
 
2.1 Sector characteristics 
The descriptive statistics presented in appendix Table 1 show that 66% of all firms are 
involved in new product development while only 37% carry out innovation in the 
hardware computer sector. Hence, the percentage of firms that are involved in new 
product development in the software sector is much higher than in the hardware sector. 
However, productivity, i.e. sales per employee (in millions of $), is higher in the 
computer hardware sector than in the computer software sector. In other words, sales per 
employee are on average about one million dollars in the whole computer sector and 
twice as much in the computer hardware. The figures for export intensity, i.e. the share of 
export sales in total sales, and increased net profit are on average similar for the computer 
hardware and software sectors. More specifically, export intensity is (on average) about 
17% in the whole sector and 13% in the hardware sector, and net profit increased for 88% 
of all firms and for 84% of the computer hardware firms. In short the propensity to 
innovate is far higher in software firms but much overall similarities exist in the two sub-
systems. 
 
The descriptive table also shows that 23% of the firms are computer hardware firms and 
also have the lower percentage of staff with university or technical degree (human 
capital) compared with the software firms. Not surprising, 73% of workers in the whole 
sector have a university or technical degree while the percentage is only 55% in the 
hardware sector. The figures for firm size, upgrade activities, technology source, 
government support, customer demand, technical capability and training in the whole 
sector are contrasted with those of the same variables in the hardware sector. On average 
hardware firms are much larger in size than software firms. More specifically, the former 
are on average three times as large, in terms of employees, and four times as large, in 
terms of sales, as firms in the software sector. Second, the percentage of firms that 
upgrade with reverse engineering and original design is on average larger in the software 
than in the hardware sub-sector, while firms that upgrade with original brand is larger in 
the latter sub-sector compared with the former. Firms that upgrade with quality control 
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are on average similar across the two sectors. And finally, when the figures on 
technology source of the whole sector is compared we find that software firms depend 
more for their technology on local expertise and in some cases on a combination of local 
and foreign expertise such as licensing from clients and buyers relative to hardware firms. 
Other sources of technology include hiring of skilled employees, collaboration with 
universities and public institutes, and reverse engineering. For hardware firms technology 
source is largely from foreign expertise and component suppliers. The two sub-sectors 
draw equally from joint venture partners, transfer from parent firm and suppliers of 
equipment.  
 
2.2. Triggers and Actors:  Empirical and Econometric Analysis of Innovation  
 
Innovation was measured by the number of new product and process development 
applied by the firms in the past five years. The survey shows that a relatively large 
percentage of the firms in the sector can be classified as “innovators”, as 66 per cent of 
the firms have been involved in a new product development within the last 5 years of 
operation, and 76 per cent have developed a new service. Our survey shows that software 
firms are more innovative than hardware firms (75% versus 37%), small firms than larger 
ones (70% versus 36%) and those firms receiving state support tend to be more 
innovative than those than do not (76% versus 58%).  Also hardware firms seem to be 
more focused on service innovation rather than product innovation. This is not surprising 
as most hardware activities are based on assembling and distribution of foreign hardware.  
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of innovation activities related to new products and 
services and between different classes and size of firms, those that receive support (Sup) 
and those that do not receive state support (NSup). 
 
Table 1: Types of Innovation 
 All Software Hardware Small Large Sup Nsup 
New products  66% 75% 37% 70% 36% 76% 58% 
New services 76% 78% 68% 76% 73% 88% 67% 
      Source: Empirical survey by authors, 2006. 
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The survey also sought to understand the triggers for such innovation; and the extent to 
which licensing and foreign support through technical training contributed to new 
product development in the sector. Most of these new products and services were 
obtained through own in-house development, particularly in the case of software firms, 
whereas hardware companies rely more often on licensing and foreign technical support 
(see table 2). This pattern of behaviour is not surprising given that computer 
manufacturing remains in a nascent phase in the country as with much of the region. 
Table 2:  Origin of Innovation 
 All Software Hardware Small Larger Sup Nsup 
Licensing 22% 24% 16% 23% 18% 21% 21% 
Own development 88% 95% 63% 92% 64% 91% 85% 
Foreign Technical 
Support  17% 17% 16% 17% 18% 18% 15% 
Others  6% 3% 16% 6% 9% 9% 4% 
   Source: Survey by authors, 2006. 
 
Approximately one third of the firms tend to innovate at the global level particularly the 
software firms. This result seems at odds with the lower exporting rate observed for the 
software sub-sector. However, the reason lies in the fact that much of their innovations 
were directed at solving local problems needs and their ability to respond creatively to 
those needs and constraints in the South African and African environments. With 
innovations driven largely by strong ‘localisation’ efforts, the incidence of low exports is 
not so surprising. 
 
On the various factors that help build innovative capabilities, the survey finds that quality 
control and reverse engineering are the major upgrading paths for the firms surveyed. 
Remarkably, 80% of the firms are mostly concerned with the quality control systems, 
although in the majority of the cases, it is an internal quality control system, based on 
crossed-staff checks of products before they go into the market. In very few cases (less 
than 25%) there is an external system of quality control, and even in those cases it is 
limited to those firms with a parent company or a single customer. The ‘other’ upgrading 
factors involve different dimension such as growing interaction with their customers’ 
needs and learning by doing (original brand) (see table 3). 
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Table 3: Nature of Innovation 
 All Software Hardware Smaller Larger Sup Nsup 
Quality Control 38% 40% 32% 39% 27% 33% 40% 
Reverse Engin eering 38% 44% 16% 41% 18% 45% 33% 
Original Design  32% 38% 11% 37% 0% 45% 23% 
Original Brand 6% 3% 16% 4% 18% 3% 8% 
Adaptive Engineering 1% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% 2% 
Others 68% 65% 79% 68% 73% 67% 71% 
Source: Empirical survey by authors, 2006. 
 
2.3. Factors Affecting New Product Development 
 
Table 4 reports maximum likelihood (ML) estimation results of the probit model that 
studies the likelihood of being involved in new product development.5 The estimated 
coefficients as well as their standard errors are reported in the first pair of columns, while 
the slope parameters (marginal effects) and their standard errors are reported in the 
second pair of columns. 
 
The first pair of columns suggests that, other things being equal, upgrade using original 
design, the effect of government assistance, collaboration, overseas technical training, 
and competitive challenge from Asia all have a strong and significant effect on the 
likelihood of a firm being involved in new product development. In addition response to 
demanding customers in order to conform to higher quality standards has a positive 
effect, which is not strongly significant. Finally, improved capability through more 
managerial training and belonging to the hardware sector decreases the likelihood of 
being involved in new product development.  
 
The second pair of columns shows the magnitude of the effects of the explanatory 
variables on the likelihood of being involved in new product development.6 Ceteris 
paribus, involvement in upgrade activity particularly with regard to original design, 
access to government assistance, investing in overseas technical training, facing more 
demanding customer demand with regard to conformity to standards, and facing severe 
                                                
5 We always report estimation results that include only the jointly significant explanatory variables.  
6 Since all the explanatory variables reported in Table 3 are binary, their marginal effects are calculated as 
discrete changes of those variables from 0 to 1, (see Greene, 2003, page 676 for more details).  
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and very severe challenge from Asian competition significantly increase the probability 
of being involved in new product development by respectively 0.385, 0.259, 0.252, 0.215 
and 0.233 (see Table 4). In other words competitive pressure is a major inducement to 
innovate. 
 
Table 4: Probit Estimation results and marginal effects: New product development 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Slope (Std. Err.) 
Original design 2.125** (0.732) 0.385** (0.083) 
Gvt. Assistance 2.255* (0.900) 0.259** (0.083) 
Capability, more manag. Training -1.611** (0.494) -
0.399** 
(0.115) 
Training, overseas technical 1.166* (0.542) 0.252* (0.104) 
Cust. dem., conf. to standards 0.816† (0.428) 0.215† (0.113) 
Asian competition 1.454* (0.648) 0.233** (0.081) 
Hardware firms  -1.756** (0.609) -
0.566** 
(0.190) 
Intercept 0.070 (0.368) - - 
Number of firms  82 
Log-likelihood -27.758 
Significance levels:       † : 10%     * : 5%     ** : 1%  
Source: Empirical survey by authors, 2006. 
 
2.4. Inter-firm Collaboration in South Africa 
 
This section presents only a descriptive analysis of collaboration, as the sample does not 
allow the estimation of an econometric model of collaboration.7 We identify six types of 
collaboration in the sample, namely collaboration with other firms, subcontractors, 
industry associations, main suppliers, domestic buyers and foreign buyers. Descriptive 
statistics show that almost 100% of the firms collaborate with other firms and with 
domestic buyers, 63% collaborate with subcontractors, 57% collaborate with industry 






                                                
7 The sample is not sufficiently informative to achieve this.  
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Other firms  1.000      
Subcontractors  0.044 1.000     
Industry Association 0.023 -0.041 1.000    
Main suppliers  0.197† 0.138 -0.066 1.000   
Domestic buyers -0.025 -0.120 -0.136 -0.056 1.000  
Foreign buyers  0.170 0.259** 0.187† 0.065 0.012 1.000 
Significance levels:       † : 10%     * : 5%     ** : 1% 
Source: Empirical survey by authors, 2006. 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix of the six types of collaboration. It suggests that 
the six types of collaboration are hardly significantly correlated. Three exceptions are 
collaboration with foreign buyers, which is positively, statistically, and significantly 
correlated with collaboration with subcontractors and members of Industry Association, 
and collaboration with main suppliers which is positively, statistically and significantly 
correlated with collaboration with other firms. Table 6 presents the characteristics of the 
collaborators contrasted with those of the non-collaborators through t- and z-tests of 
equality of means and percentages across the two populations of firms.  
 
Collaboration with Sub-contractors 
The first pair of columns of Table 5 shows the characteristics of collaborators and non-
collaborators with subcontractors. Firms that collaborate with subcontractors have on 
average a larger share of export in total sales and are older than those that do not 
collaborate with subcontractors. The percentage of firms collaborating with sub-
contractors have greater net profits, higher product quality and product innovation 
capabilities than those that do not. In other words, the more established firms tend to 
focus collaboration with an aim to enhance exports and quality and predictably tend to 
earn higher net profit. 
 
Collaboration with Industry Associations 
The characteristics of collaborators and non-collaborators with Industry Associations are 
reported in the second pair of columns of the table. Firms that collaborate within Industry 
Associations have on average smaller productivity, and are smaller with respect to the 
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three measures of size than those that do not collaborate within an Industry Association. 
Furthermore, a larger percentage of collaborators receive government assistance and have 
product innovation improved capability, while a larger percentage of non-collaborators 
have in-house management and local training. This is not surprising because it is often 
the small and medium firms with less internal capabilities that participate more actively 
in collective support programmes provided by governments and industry associations.  
 
Table 6: The characteristics of collaborators and non-collaborators 
Variable Mean 
 Subcontractors Industry 
Association 
Main Suppliers Foreign Buyers 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Product innovation 0.567 0.712 0.571 0.723 0.667 0.658 0.605 0.705 
Productivity in 2005 0.609 1.217 1.435† 0.667† 1.662 0.912 0.702 1.247 
Export intensity 0.098* 0.212* 0.128 0.203 0.141 0.171 0.003* 0.315* 
Increased net profit  0.700* 0.981* 0.857 0.894 0.778 0.890 0.789* 0.955* 
Size 79.500 59.577 119.743
† 
27.489† 36.111 70.658 89.079 47.682 
Large firms 0.200 0.096 0.229† 0.064† 0.111 0.137 0.132 0.136 
Turnover in 2005 139.782 154.306 317.426
† 
23.563† 390.322 119.239 155.886 143.039 
Hardware firms  0.267 0.212 0.257 0.213 0.111 0.247 0.237 0.227 
Age 4.233* 7.558* 7.543 5.447 4.333 6.589 5.000 7.500 
Human capital 0.763 0.702 0.647 0.783 0.736 0.723 0.746 0.707 
Asian competition 0.167 0.192 0.143 0.213 0.222 0.178 0.132 0.227 
Gvt. Assistance 0.100 0.154 0.057* 0.191* 0.111 0.137 0.105 0.159 
Capability, more 
manag. Training 
0.467 0.538 0.543 0.489 0.222* 0.548* 0.474 0.545 
Capability, more 
techn. training  
0.833 0.712 0.771 0.745 0.556 0.781 0.816 0.705 
Capability, improve 
quality 
0.533* 0.699* 0.714 0.660 0.556 0.697 0.605 0.750 
Capability, product 
innovation 
0.467* 0.763* 0.486* 0.681* 0.556 0.603 0.474* 0.705* 
Training, in-house 
technical 
0.867 0.962 0.914 0.936 0.778* 0.945* 0.895 0.955 
Training, in-house 
management 
0.567 0.731 0.771† 0.596† 0.667 0.671 0.632 0.705 
Training, overseas 
technical 
0.267 0.404 0.429 0.298 0.111* 0.384* 0.211* 0.477* 
Training, overseas 
management 
0.067 0.077 0.114 0.043 0.000 0.082 0.026 0.114 
Training, local 
training 
0.733 0.615 0.800† 0.553† 0.556 0.671 0.737 0.591 
Number of firms  30 52 35 47 9 73 38 44 
The figures are on average statistically and significantly larger for *collaborators, †non-collaborators. 
Source: Empirical survey by authors, 2006 
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Collaboration with Main Suppliers 
The characteristics of collaborators and non-collaborators with main suppliers are 
reported in the third pair of columns of the table. Collaborators in this category tend to 
devote more explicit investment to building management capability, in-house and 
overseas technical training compared with the non-collaborators.  
 
Collaboration with Foreign Buyers 
Finally the last pair of columns of the table shows the characteristics of collaborators and 
non-collaborators with foreign buyers. Firms that collaborate with foreign buyers have on 
average higher export intensity than those that do not collaborate with foreign buyers. 
Furthermore, a larger percentage of collaborators have increased net profit, product 
innovation, improved capability and overseas technical training. 
 
In sum, the descriptive analysis of collaboration shows that many characteristics of firms 
that are collaborators and those that are non-collaborators are similar but the partners they 
choose to interact with results in significant differences in terms of performance 
behavior. For instance, firm export intensity is higher for firms that collaborate with 
subcontractors and foreign buyers than those who do not collaborate with those same 
partners. Also, small-sized firms tend to be the most intense collaborators with industry 
associations presumably to lobby for greater support as well as benefit from 
governmental subsidies. Firms that collaborate with subcontractors are also on average 
older than the non-collaborators, and indulge much more in own product development 
and capacity development (such as training). This points out to the need for more support 
for younger, nascent firms in the sector. 
 
2.5. State Support and Collaborative Behaviour 
From our interviews we find that government support is directed equally towards 
software and hardware firms. There are a few exceptions in the kinds of support 
structures. The survey found that targeted innovation incentives, science park/cluster 
advantage, and special support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that are directed 
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specifically towards the software sector,8 while public sector R&D institutions for 
technical solutions and bank loans are mainly directed towards the hardware sector. In 
other words, government has had a differentiated approach to the two sub-sectors in 
addition to the more general macro level support. The main sector-specific governmental 
initiatives are summarized in Box 1 below. 
 
Box 1: Government Initiatives for ICTs in South Africa  
The first attempt to develop a sector-specific initiative can be traced back to the South African 
Information Technology Industry Strategy (SAITIS), in 1995. There were stakeholder meetings 
conducted on the SAITIS project and the selection of a group of 37 stakeholders as an Advisory 
Group to the SAITIS Project. They represented key organizations and agencies with interests in 
the sector. The outcome was a Project Design Document (PDD) to guide the direction of the 
project and the establishment of a Project Steering Committee (PSC). 
 
The Government of South Africa was also supported by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), under its Country Development program for South Africa to develop the South 
African ICT Sector Development framework in November 2000. Among the numerous goals in 
this framework, the ones relevant for the ICT sector were those related to: accelerate growth of 
the base of ICT SMEs, focus on regional growth through clusters, particularly in Gauteng and the 
Western Cape (mainly Cape Town), and upgrade local expertise to compete in the regional and 
global markets. Special emphasis was placed on creating and supporting new entrants particularly 
SMEs. Following the release of the ICT Sector Development framework, the ICT Development 
Council was established in 2000 by the Department of Trade and Industry. The Strategic 
Industrial Projects (SIP) that started in 2001 and is managed by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) provides between 50% and 100% tax allowance to encourage investments from 
local and foreign investors. To support firms further, import duties on IT hardware and software 
were abolished on 2003. Presently, the firms importing into South Africa only pay a Value Added 
Tax (VAT) to the South African Customs. As hardware firms source technology mostly from 
abroad, release from import duties highly benefits South African small firms.  
Source: Empirical survey by authors, 2006.  
 
In addition to these, there are a number of provincial initiatives particularly in Gauteng 
and Western Cape. In the Gauteng province the government launched the Blue IQ 
programme in 20029. The first phase of the Blue IQ involved the delivery of 11 strategic 
projects; the second phase of commercialisation is expected to be dependent on private 
sector participation. One of these projects was the creation of the Innovation Hub, an ICT 
incubator and Science Park. The innovation Hub and other similar ICT incubating 
                                                
8 The fact that special support for SMEs is mainly directed towards the software sector makes sense as firms in that 
sector are on average smaller than the those in the hardware sector.  
9 Through Blue IQ, the Gauteng local government is investing R3.7 billion in 11 projects for “strategic” 
industries and value-added manufacturing to restructure the composition of the provincial economy. 
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activities are at the centre of the technology support services strategy directed to small 
entrepreneurs in Gauteng. Also, the Western Cape Province has recently started 
challenging the dominant position of Gauteng. The Western Cape provincial government, 
along with the Municipality of Cape Town are devoting efforts to promote the Western 
Cape into a growing hub for ICT activities and various policies are directly focused on 
strengthening the sector. 
 
Overall, state policy has been one of non-intervention along with certain innovation 
incentives; the computer hardware industry has enjoyed some of the lowest tariff levels. 
The flip side is the lack of manufacturing depth of the domestic industry, which needs 
policy initiatives to be in tandem with the needs of the firms and sectoral characteristics. 
Especially, given the dominance of a large number of small and medium scale enterprises 
in the sector, much more than tax holidays are required to sustain the growth and enhance 
long term competitiveness. 
 
3. Systemic Collaboration and Performance in Malaysia 
 
In Malaysia, the government established the Kulim and Bukit Jalil high-tech parks in the 
1990s although clusters such as Penang have been in existence already twenty years prior 
to these developments. The Malaysian survey focused the computer and components 
clusters in Penang and Johor. Few firms are engaged in assembling computers but most 
of the firms are engaged in computer components (e.g. capacitors, resistors, PCBs, diodes 
and semiconductor chips) and completely knocked down (CKD) parts (e.g. monitors, 
keyboards and LCD screens) assembly. 
 
3.1. State Support and Patterns of Collaboration 
In order to attract high-tech firms engaged in R&D activities to the clusters and the high-
tech parks, the government offered pioneer-status tax incentives. Electronics firms 
became the prime beneficiary of this initiative, although the rate of take-up has been 
relatively low compared to that of the free trade zones (FTZs) and LMWs. Additionally, 
systemic coordination has been facilitated by strong cooperation between the state 
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cooperations and firms for various requirements in the innovation process, and the 
comparison between Penang and Johor shows the impact of varying levels of state 
support. For example, the Penang state’s Penang Development Corporation (PDC) 
facilitates systemic coordination amongst firms through the provision of basic 
infrastructure, among others. A notable example of this sort of policy coordination is the 
joint approach by the Free Trade Zone Penang Companies Association (FREPENCA) 
with PDC. This form of strategic intervention in developing infrastructure and other basic 
services in Penang over time had been instrumental in fostering technological capacity. It 
has had the effect of facilitating transportation while the other cluster namely Johor has 
been unable to acquire comparative capacity to provide such service. As a result of good 
physical infrastructure, the region has succeeded in attracting flagship firms including 
more than ten semiconductor firms to Penang. In contrast, with the exception of ST 
Electronics (located in Muar) there are no semiconductor firms in Johor.  
 
The knowledge infrastructure in Penang is also better than that in Johor although the 
country in general does not have a significant number of R&D labs and in comparative 
terms, lack strong R&D human capital for the kind of growth that the sector has 
exhibited. Similar to the firms in South Africa, firms in both clusters in Malaysia also 
learn mainly through quality control activities and reverse engineering. Technological 
capabilities developed within firms in Penang are significantly higher and varied 
compared with electronics firms in Johor and this can also be contributed to the 
interactions between local and foreign firms in the cluster. But overall, the supply of 
R&D and human capital yielded very low means irrespective of location or ownership, 
which validates the poor human capital in Malaysia.10 It is unclear if government 
announcement in 2006 to provide Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) status to Penang 
and Johor has effected any changes on firms’ conduct on R&D activities. 
 
Despite this shortcoming it is evident that greater systemic coordination promoted by the 
physical and other infrastructure supplied by the government with strong support from 
                                                
10 For instance in various interviews, Intel, AMD, Hewlett Packard and Dell officials in Penang reported in 2004 their 
inability to undertake more R&D activities because of limits imposed on the import of foreign human capital. 
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the chambers of commerce, FREPENCA and coordinated by the PDC, was instrumental 
to forging relationships between firms and institutions in Penang, whereas the same 
deficiencies curb the performance of Johor.  
 
Empirical evidence comparing the two clusters (in table 6) show superior rating for firms 
in Penang compared to firms located in Johor in all the statistically significant two-tailed 
results. Knowledge infrastructure represented by R&D support was statistically 
insignificant, which is reflected by a lack of any sort of R&D relationships between firms 
(both foreign and local) and R&D institutions (e.g. university R&D, Malaysian Institute 
of Microelectronics System and the incubators put up in technology parks by the 
government). Collaboration between local firms and standards organizations is only 
statistically significant (at 5% level). Interviews showed that local firms mainly sought 
the international standards organization 9000 series certification from the Standards and 
Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM). 
 
Table 7: Systemic Collaboration: Computer and Related Component Firms’, Penang and Johor, 
2004 





Ministries 2.75 3.05 -1.01 2.17 2.77 -0.97 
Industry 
Association 
2.17 3.67 -3.15* 2.05 3.25 -2.95* 
Training 
institutions 
2.01 3.98 -3.25* 2.15 3.33 -3.02* 
Universities 1.03 2.01 -3.11*    
State Development 
Corporation 
2.35 3.57 -2.75* 2.11 2.63 -2.25** 
R&D support Units 0.1 0.3 -0.01 0.2 0.5 -0.10 
Incubators  0 0 -0.00 0 0 0.00 
Standards 
Organization 
2.01 2.15 -0.70 1.88 2.54 -2.45** 
Horizontal inter-
firm links 
1.87 2.45 -2.68* 1.90 2.33 -1.88 
Vertical inter-firm 
links 
2.11 2.95 -2.45** 2.00 2.47 -2.01** 
Complementary 
Supplier links 
2.21 3.13 -2.97* 2.02 2.94 -2.54** 
N 332 28  39 37  
Source: Empirical Survey, 2004. 
Note: Likert scale score of firms (0-5 with from none to highest possible rating); * and ** 
- statistically significant at 1% and 5% respectively. 
Paper presented in the IV Globelics Conference at Mexico City, September 22-24 2008 
 
Clearly one of the reasons for the relative superiority of Penang is that it was started 
much earlier and for much of this time there has been a consistent history of investment 
in the cluster since the seventies. For instance Penang Electronics was the first electronics 
firm to be started in 1970, followed by Orion and National Semiconductor in 1971. 
Investment in Johor however started only from the 1980s. However what marks out the 
two are the series of explicit investments resulting in the more advanced technical and 
institutional coordination and knowledge infrastructure that favoured Penang.  
 
4. Comparative Insights and Conclusions 
Technological learning involves not just technical learning but learning to build the right 
kinds of organizations and to foster the institutional forms within which policies would 
make the expected impact. In the last three decades we have learnt a great deal about the 
nature and processes by which latecomer countries acquire capabilities but we also have a 
long way to go in constructing a framework that systematically takes account of the 
diverse and increasingly differentiated paths of development being taken by latecomers. 
Much has been learnt through firm-level studies (Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995; 
Hobday, 1995) but there is a growing level of dis-aggregation among latecomers that we 
need to begin to address them on this basis. For instance most of the current work focus 
on the success cases of East Asia “advanced” latecomers to understand the reasons and 
different pathways to success while much less has been done on the lagging (“falling 
behind”) firms and countries. With these countries learning has come to be 
conceptualized on the strength of R&D carried out and patents taken just as in the case of 
industrialized countries. In the lagging latecomers, learning is difficult to quantify, 
measure or even observe because much of the activity, including incremental technical 
change is experiential and tacit in nature. At a conceptual level, R&D is not equal to 
innovation as it is as an instrument of learning. Non-R&D activities (prototype building, 
design and quality testing for instance) tend to consume a much higher proportion of 
firm-level level investment in new products and processes and this is highly disconnected 
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from the limited R&D taking place in the local contexts. In essence, orthodox measures 
create a misleading impression of the learning processes in latecomer countries.   
The empirical results reinforce the role of the state in supporting innovation through 
purposive action, we find evidence of the limitation of the state in deliberately building 
knowledge infrastructure. Furthermore, the two country analyses show that the focus 
should not simply be on enacting a long list of institutions that have worked elsewhere, 
but rather on the combination of specific institutional local innovation as well as working 
on generating coherence and harmony of institutions and policies that bring about 
change. The systematic analysis of firm-level behaviour in both countries also shows 
clearly that systemic collaboration promotes production and export as well as innovation 
performance of firms. This again confirms what the literature tells us in theory and what 
has been established in several other studies of this kind. What is novel is that this 
analysis was carried out for latecomer countries in two separate policy settings with 
different historical and policy settings. 
 
4.1. Composition and capabilities accumulation amongst actors 
 
The main actors and capabilities in the computer hardware sector are engineers, and 
scientists. The core knowledge infrastructure includes scientific laboratories as well as 
design and research centers. The availability of scientific infrastructure, firms, 
universities and public research institutes determine the scope for specialization in any or 
all of the stages of the computer hardware industry, both physical and human capital 
related, which are specific for each one of its sub-stages11. Each of these sub-stages 
requires different combination of knowledge and skills of actors from various disciplines, 
some as diverse as physics, informatics and computer science required to facilitate 
innovation. This scope of diverse actor competences points to the limits of vision and 
action that a country might attempt. Fast Followers such as Malaysia are well able to take 
advantage of global knowledge pool in this sector but this might stretch the resources of 
most late comers (group 3). 
                                                
1111 The sub-stages comprise: (1) product design, (2) component manufacturing, (3) assembly, (4) software 
development, (5) marketing, and (6) distribution. 
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In Malaysia, the computers and computer peripherals sector has become one of the fastest 
growing sectors with the establishment of manufacturing facilities by global players like 
Dell, NEC, Samsung, BenQ Technologies, Fujitsu and Mitsumi. Besides these MNCs, six 
Malaysian companies – Nascom, FTEC System, Gerak Mobile, Perbadanan Komputer 
National Berhad, MIMOS and I-Berhad – are currently producing Malaysian brands for 
the domestic and export markets. The first phase of Malaysia’s electronics industry 
included almost no local firms—except for a few small ones such as Penang Electronics, 
established in 1970. Foreign direct investment (FDI) dominated the small manufacturing 
sector, but FDI levels declined from 1975 until the 1980s, when local firms who learned 
from the presence of foreign firms began to innovate with the help of state support. 
 
Malaysia has a well-established supplier industries producing components and parts such 
as motherboards, disk drives, power supply units, connectors, printed circuit board 
assemblies, casings, plastic moulded parts and precision metal stamped/machined parts. 
On the contrary, South Africa’s sector comprises four types of firms: 
1) A small number of growing large indigenous firms, some of which have achieved 
multi-national status; 
2) Several State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that are major players in the ICT market;  
3) A growing base of small and medium enterprises specializing in ICTs; and, 
4) A number of foreign-owned multinational companies (MNC’s) that have established a 
presence and business relationships in South Africa. 
 
All these firms interact to different degrees with each other and the preponderance of 
foreign firms in South Africa has been partly fostered by deliberate policy action to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 1994 and 2001, the IT and 
telecommunications sub-sectors attracted the highest share of FDI in the country12. In 
                                                
12 16 billion Rands (Moleke & al, 2003) 
In Nigeria, Mauritius and Indonesia the main actors are small and medium assemblers with little 
connection to global CH players. 
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spite of this high level of foreign investment, the growth of the sector in South Africa is 
currently driven by domestic consumption rather than by exports as our survey shows. 
The telephony firms such as Telkom and Vodacom and State Owned Enterprises, for 
example Eskom, Transcom, and SABC, have entered into broad ICT activities such as 
telecommunications infrastructure and services, applications and content. These firms 
have adapted to the evolving domestic sector and have been largely driven by local 
consumption compared to Malaysia where the strategy has been to exploit global export 
market opportunities. Small firms largely dominate the sector with little prospects for 
significant global reach. So far, state policy has been one of non-intervention as the 
computer hardware industry has enjoyed some of the lowest tariff levels. The flip side is 
the lack of manufacturing depth of the domestic industry. 
 
4.2. Impact of policy choices on learning  
 
Due in part to historical path-dependent factors and more directly as a consequence of 
choices made by the state, the nature and attributes of regional clusters differ in very 
many respects and this also impacts upon their performance. Policy choices made by 
different governments and in coordination with other non-state actors have been 
instrumental in shaping the development of the clusters in both countries. For instance, 
the relatively hands-off approach to industrial coordination by state development 
corporations outside Penang (Malaysia) limited intensity of inter-firm relationships and 
also the potential of other clusters to develop and thrive. The Penang cluster has enjoyed  
the most consistent government and private investment and has therefore had the most 
success in terms of systemic cohesion compared with other regions in Malaysia. 
 
However, the two country examples highlight the limitation of the state in deliberately 
building knowledge infrastructure. States have limited resources and different geographic 
zones have evolved from specific institutional settings that may not all be necessarily 
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amenable to uniform policy intervention. The contrasting cases of Gauteng and Western 
Cape on one hand and Penang Valley compared with Johor on the other illustrate this 
very well. In South Africa, there is evidence of purposive government intervention at 
building knowledge infrastructure especially at regional levels but the outcomes have 
been far different from what obtains in Malaysia. For instance South Africa has had little 
success in computer hardware (CH) manufacturing and export, while Malaysia has made 
major strides as a global export player. In other words, while infrastructure is a necessary 
condition it is not sufficient. What counts is the combination of factors as well as the 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
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Source: Empirical survey by authors, 2006. 
 
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. 
 All firms Hardware computer firms 
Product innovator† 0.659 (0.477) 0 1 0.368 (0.496) 0 1 
Productivity in 2005* 0.995 (1.715) 0.019 13.462 2.026 (2.931) 0.167 13.462 
Export intensity 0.171 (0.292) 0 1 0.133 (0.271) 0 0.98 
Increased net profit  0.878 (0.329) 0 1 0.842 (0.375) 0 1 
Size* 66.866 (159.639) 2 1162 198.316 (290.389) 2 1162 
Large firms* 0.134 (0.343) 0 1 0.421 (0.507) 0 1 
Turnover in 2005* 148.992 (533.796) 0.075 3500 576.121 (1013.127) 1.200 3500 
Hardware firms 0.232 (0.425) 0 1 - - - - 
Human capital† 0.725 (0.257) 0.138 1 0.550 (0.281) 0.138 1 
Asian competition 0.183 (0.389) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Quality control 0.378 (0.488) 0 1 0.316 (0.478) 0 1 
Upgrade, reverse engineering† 0.378 (0.488) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Original design† 0.317 (0.468) 0 1 0.105 (0.315) 0 1 
Original brand* 0.061 (0.241) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Local expertise† 0.146 (0.356) 0 1 0.000 (0.000) 0 0 
Foreign expertise* 0.159 (0.367) 0 1 0.474 (0.513) 0 1 
Combination† 0.695 (0.463) 0 1 0.526 (0.513) 0 1 
Licensing from clients† 0.744 (0.439) 0 1 0.474 (0.513) 0 1 
Buyers† 0.183 (0.389) 0 1 0.053 (0.229) 0 1 
Joint venture partner 0.622 (0.488) 0 1 0.474 (0.513) 0 1 
Component suppliers* 0.280 (0.452) 0 1 0.579 (0.507) 0 1 
Transfer from parent firm 0.146 (0.356) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Managers/skilled employees† 0.866 (0.343) 0 1 0.737 (0.452) 0 1 
Suppliers of equipment  0.951 (0.217) 0 1 0.947 (0.229) 0 1 
Univ. and public inst.†  0.195 (0.399) 0 1 0.053 (0.229) 0 1 
Tech. source, reverse engineering† 0.512 (0.503) 0 1 0.211 (0.419) 0 1 
Gvt. assistance 0.134 (0.343) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., innov. incentives† 0.280 (0.452) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., avail. skilled manpower 0.171 (0.379) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., local univ. for R&D col.  0.220 (0.416) 0 1 0.263 (0.452) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., R&D inst. for tech. sol.*  0.073 (0.262) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., IPP 0.305 (0.463) 0 1 0.263 (0.452) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., quality of IT sup. serv.  0.183 (0.389) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., avail. venture capital 0.232 (0.425) 0 1 0.263 (0.452) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., bank loans* 0.110 (0.315) 0 1 0.211 (0.419) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., innov. subsidy  0.329 (0.473) 0 1 0.263 (0.452) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., taxation policy  0.085 (0.281) 0 1 0.105 (0.315) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., science clust. advant.†  0.537 (0.502) 0 1 0.316 (0.478) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., procurement policy 0.232 (0.425) 0 1 0.263 (0.452) 0 1 
Gvt. supp., spec. supp. for SMEs † 0.451 (0.501) 0 1 0.316 (0.478) 0 1 
Gvt. dem., faster deliv. time  0.561 (0.499) 0 1 0.526 (0.513) 0 1 
Gvt. dem., packaging quality† 0.305 (0.463) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Gvt. dem., conf. to standards 0.549 (0.501) 0 1 0.474 (0.513) 0 1 
Gvt. dem., price 0.634 (0.485) 0 1 0.737 (0.452) 0 1 
Gvt. dem., product quality  0.768 (0.425) 0 1 0.684 (0.478) 0 1 
Capability, more manag. training  0.512 (0.503) 0 1 0.474 (0.513) 0 1 
Capability, more techn. training 0.756 (0.432) 0 1 0.842 (0.375) 0 1 
Capability, improve quality 0.683 (0.468) 0 1 0.579 (0.507) 0 1 
Capability, product innovation† 0.598 (0.493) 0 1 0.368 (0.496) 0 1 
Training, in-house technical 0.927 (0.262) 0 1 0.947 (0.229) 0 1 
Training, in-house management 0.671 (0.473) 0 1 0.684 (0.478) 0 1 
Training, overseas technical* 0.354 (0.481) 0 1 0.579 (0.507) 0 1 
Training, overseas management* 0.073 (0.262) 0 1 0.158 (0.375) 0 1 
Training, local training*  0.659 (0.477) 0 1 0.789 (0.419) 0 1 
Number of firms  82 19 
†These figures are larger on average in the software sector. *These figures are larger on average in the hardware sector. 
